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Sending the Self-Execution Doctrine to the
Executioner
Aya Gruber*
INTRODUCTION
Justice Ginsburg, our inestimable keynote speaker, stated elsewhere that “[n]ational, multinational and international human rights
charters and tribunals today play a key part in a world with increasingly porous borders,” such that “[w]e are the losers if we do not both
1
share our experience with, and learn from others.” In this day and
age, internationalism is simply unavoidable. The years following 9/11
saw international law and the law of armed conflict rise to the forefront of our legal and national consciousness. Terms like “Geneva
Conventions,” “war crimes,” and “international human rights” be2
came entrenched in the American political vocabulary. Indeed, the
past few terms of the Supreme Court involved several cases touching
3
upon issues of international law and norms. Recently, much has been

*
Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. I express
my deepest gratitude to the organizers of the FIU Inauguration Symposium, “The Intersection
of United States Constitutional Law with International and Foreign Law,” my fellow symposium
participants, Harold Koh, Erwin Chemerinsky, Anthony D’Amato, Drew Days, III, Christopher
Edley, Jr., Francisco Valdes, Elizabeth Foley, Stanley Fish, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, as
well as the Dean, faculty, and administration of the FIU College of Law. In particular, I wish to
thank Jorge Esquirol, who provided me valuable guidance on this subject. I am also grateful for
the diligent work of my research assistant, Tom Werge.
1
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond our Borders: The Value of a Comparative
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329 (2004).
2
See, e.g., John Mintz, On Detainees, U.S. Faces Legal Quandary; Most Experts Say Al
Qaeda Members Aren’t POWs but Taliban Fighters Might Be, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at A22;
Paisley Dodds, U.S. Legislators Visiting Guantánamo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 25, 2002; Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Prisoners; Rumsfeld Lists Outcomes for Detainees Held
in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A10. See Norman J. Finkel, Moral Monsters and Patriot
Acts: Rights and Duties in the Worst of Times, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 242, 265 (2006)
(noting that “[t]he press, including the international press . . . has run critical stories about alleged abuse and/or torture of suspected terrorists in Iraqi prisons and at Guantánamo, violations
of the Geneva Convention”).
3
See Beth Van Schaack, International Law in the United States Legal System: Observance,
Application, and Enforcement, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 807 (2005) (“[S]tarting with the Court’s
2002 Term, the quality and quantity of Supreme Court cases touching on international law has
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made of the Court’s burgeoning internationalism, rendering the topic
4
a subject of frequent academic and popular discussion. Some rejoice
at observations, like Justice Ginsburg’s, that the Court’s “‘island’ or
5
‘lone ranger’ mentality is beginning to change.” Others decry the
influence of foreign law and values on American domestic law as a
6
precursor to total loss of sovereignty. Yet others feel that the Supreme Court’s newly-minted commitment to international law may be
7
more show than substance.
Claims of the Supreme Court’s increasing awareness and integration of international consensus and norms appear vindicated by deci8
sions like Roper v. Simmons, which incorporates international opinion
into the “evolving standards of decency” analysis of juvenile execu9
tion. The argument that the Supreme Court is still not fulfilling its
potential as a validator of international law is supported by cases like
10
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, in which the Court interpreted the Alien
Torts Claims Act to permit private claims under federal common law
for violations of customary international law, but defined customary
international law narrowly with reference to the law of nations in 1789
11
(the year the Act was passed).
In this Essay, I contend the Supreme Court can never truly abandon its “island” mentality until it is willing to reaffirm the status of
treaties as supreme federal law in the face of anti-internationalist low-

significantly raised the visibility of [the international law] tradition on the bench, in the academy,
in the press, and among members of the general public.”).
4
See, e.g., Jordan Paust, International Law Before the Supreme Court: A Mixed Record of
Recognition, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 829 (2005); Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party of International Law: The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations of Foreign and International Law, 29 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 507 (2006); Mark Weston Janis,
The American Tradition of International Law: Exceptionalism and Universalism, 21 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 211, 212 (2006); Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 291 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J.
INT’L L. 43, 46 (2004); John O. McGinnis, Contemporary Foreign International Law in Constitutional Construction, 69 ALB. L. REV. 801 (2006); Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 285–86 (2006).
5
Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 335.
6
See, e.g., Kochan, supra note 4, at 507 (asserting that “[t]his trend is inappropriate, undemocratic, and dangerous”). See also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 329 (describing international law as product of “global networks” of elites that threatens “national sovereignty”).
7
See, e.g., Paust, supra note 4, at 855 (noting that in 2004 term, Supreme Court viewed
international law “obliquely” and often used it merely to supplement domestic construction).
8
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
9
Id. at 554.
10 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
11 Id. at 732. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 4, at 288 (explaining that in Sosa, “Justice Souter
carefully avoids identifying any rules of customary international law that do meet the standards
of wide acceptance and definite content necessary for new causes of action in ATS cases” and
“adds numerous other caveats and considerations”).
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er decisions that have created a super-charged self-execution doctrine.
12
The self-execution doctrine is a judicial invention holding that a treaty only provides judicially-enforceable rights if it “operates of itself”
13
or if Congress implements it through specific legislation. Over the
past forty years, lower courts have substantially narrowed the class of
treaties that operate of themselves and created a presumption of do14
mestic unenforceability. Unless the Supreme Court is willing to
sound the death knell of the modern self-execution doctrine, it cannot
truly embrace the value of international law. Recently, the Court had
15
two very good opportunities to declare the Geneva Conventions self16
17
executing in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Unfortunately, the Court went to great lengths to avoid the self-execution
issue, even though a resolution of the question of Geneva selfexecution was clearly called for.
This Essay is an exhortation to the Court to take up the treaty
self-execution issue and finally push back the rising tide of isolationism in the doctrine created by lower courts exhibiting a basic skepticism of international law. Part I of the Essay discusses the pervasive
force of modern isolationist philosophies. It also examines the movement of the Court, or at least individual Justices, away from this philosophy. Part II examines the history of the self-execution doctrine
and shows how it has morphed from a fairly straightforward contractbased doctrine into a mechanism that thwarts the enforceability of
valid federal law, merely because it is set forth in an international instrument. Finally, Part III analyzes the Supreme Court’s stand on selfexecution, noting the paucity of recent cases on the doctrine, and
maintains that the Court should have taken the opportunity to discuss
self-execution in the terrorism detention decisions.
I. ISOLATIONISM & INTERNATIONALISM
Professor Mark Westin Janis, states:
Crafting an international law that weaves the nations together while not dismissing their genuine and healthy diversity is a real challenge. In a word, American interna12 See Jordan J. Paust, Self–Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 766 (1988) (characterizing self–execution doctrine as judicial invention).
13 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
14 See infra notes 112–30 and accompanying text.
15 By “Geneva Conventions” and “Geneva,” I refer primarily to the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter “Third Geneva Convention”].
16 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
17 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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tional lawyers need to translate international law universalism to America’s exceptionalists, and to translate American international law exceptionalism to international law’s
18
universalists.
To be sure, the question of isolation versus internationalism is a
difficult one, as is the more abstract issue of universal human rights
19
versus cultural values. On one hand, isolationism is closely associated with xenophobia, hostility to human rights, and the rejection of
20
civilized advancement. On the other hand, not even the most ardent
internationalist would assert that international law should transplant
all domestic legislation or that foreign countries’ traditions should
21
completely displace American values. Recently, in the legal academy,
analysis of U.S. isolationism has given way to extensive discussion of a
22
23
related phenomenon, American exceptionalism. Loosely, exceptionalism denotes the United States’ Janus-faced stance on international

18

Janis, supra note 4, at 212.
See generally Michel Rosenfeld, Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap Between Universalism and Cultural Relativism? A Pluralist Assessment Based on the Rights of Minorities, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249 (1999) (deconstructing perceived relativism–universalism irreconcilability).
20 Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam criticizes constitutional law scholars for failing to
“enshrine the most enlightened and progressive ideals of the community of nations” because of a
prevalent “[i]solationist thinking bred of the comfortable, cocky myth of American exceptionalism.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the Maurice A.
Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, November 22, 2004, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
403 (2004). See also Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 68
(2006) (“American Exceptionalism can carry connotations of xenophobia or downright lawlessness.”) (footnote omitted).
21 Justice Scalia states, “What’s going on here? Do you want [international law] to be
authoritative? I doubt whether anybody would say, ‘Yes, we want to be governed by the views of
foreigners.’ Well if you don’t want it to be authoritative, then what is the criterion for citing it
not [sic]? That it agrees with you?” See Justices Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005) (Discussion at the American University
Washington College of Law), transcript available at http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/
mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?
OpenDocument [hereinafter Scalia–Breyer debate].
22 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); Harold Honju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1513–15 (2003). Mark B. Rotenberg notes that “[t]he
Bush administration’s response to the attacks of 9/11 . . . has revived exceptionalism as a leading
theme for American politicians, social commentators, and international critics alike.” Mark B.
Rotenberg, America’s Ambiguous Exceptionalism, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 188, 188–89 (2005).
23 Given that this Essay is not generally about deconstructing the concept of isolationism
and American exceptionalism, I use these terms quite loosely to describe hostility to the domestic influence of international and foreign laws and norms. In this sense, I must admit that I am
readily subject to Dean Koh’s criticism that “the term ‘American exceptionalism’ has been used
far too loosely and without meaningful nuance.” Koh, supra note 22, at 1482.
19
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24

law. One face of the United States touts itself as a leader in international human rights, engages in humanitarian and not-so-humanitarian
military campaigns in the name of the rule of law, and signs interna25
tional human rights treaties. The other face holds that the United
States ought to be exempt from international rules of law and uses
26
legal mechanisms to undermine the enforcement of treaties. Although the faces of American exceptionalism may appear inconsistent,
there is a reconciling principle. Exceptionalism describes the tendency of the U.S. to view itself as a creator and validator of first legal
27
principles. Thus, internationalism is useful only to the extent that it
helps the exportation of American-ness, but not for any internaliza28
tion of foreign principles.
While this Essay does not seek to present an exhaustive critique
of isolationism or exceptionalism, I will advance a normative argument against the prevailing isolationist philosophy. In its best light,
exceptionalism has a couple of apparently positive aspects: First, the
United States’ promotion of “American” values, while certainly subject to criticism, can potentially further the rule of law and human
29
rights. Our distinguished symposium participant Dean Harold Koh
notes that “the best face of American exceptionalism proves to be the
30
face that promotes the rule of law.” Second, as Professor Janis as31
serts, exceptionalism can protect “genuine and healthy diversity.”
The first benefit of exceptionalism, while not all-together uncontro24 See Koh, supra note 22, at 1482–83. President Bush is an exceptionalist in the sense that
on one hand, he claims to embrace principles of international law, and on the other hand, he
refuses to be constrained by those laws. See Philippe Sands QC, Lawless World? The Bush Administration and Iraq: Issues of International Legality and Criminality, 29 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 295, 301 (2006) (describing Bush’s “a la carte multilateralism”).
25 The negative aspect is America’s aggressive military interventionism, while the positive
is America’s “exceptional global leadership and activism.” Koh, supra note 22, at 1487.
26 See MARGARET MACMILLAN, PEACEMAKERS: THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1919 AND
ITS ATTEMPT TO END WAR 22 (2001) (“American exceptionalism has always had two sides: the
one eager to set the world to rights, the other ready to turn its back with contempt if its message
should be ignored.”); Resnik, supra note 22, at 1582 (noting that some take exceptionalism as
license for unilateralism); Koh, supra note 22, at 1482–83 (asserting that one face of exceptionalism is hostility to international law, including valid treaty law).
27 See Resnik, supra note 22, at 1582–83 (“For some, as the exceptional nation, America
should be a ‘model . . . with a special and unique destiny to lead the rest of the world to freedom
and democracy.’”) (quoting INTRODUCTION TO IMAGINED HISTORIES: AMERICAN HISTORIANS
INTERPRET THE PAST 4 (Anthony Molho & Gordon S. Wood eds., 1998)).
28 See Koh, supra note 22, at 1497–98 (criticizing America’s double standard approach to
international law).
29 While it is suspect for the United States to impose its version of the rule of law through
military force, America’s role as a moral and financial supporter of human rights and the rule of
law is less problematic. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
30 Koh, supra note 22, at 1494.
31 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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versial, is not a product of isolationism but of involvement in world
32
affairs, albeit in an incredibly one-sided way. Consequently, the
second perceived benefit is more germane to this Essay. The idea is
that in order to protect its democratic values and even sovereignty, the
United States must erect barriers to the influence of international
33
laws and norms. Otherwise, there will be only one set of “world”
values and the international community will be devoid of its “healthy
34
diversity.”
Indeed, the idea that accepting international law will destroy
American values and autonomy is continually emphasized by con35
servative scholars and Supreme Court justices. Dean Koh explains
that this philosophy enables a “nationalist jurisprudence,” in which
foreign law is considered “irrelevant, or worse yet, an impermissible
36
imposition on the exercise of American sovereignty.” Conservative
Court members consistently repeat the mantra that international con37
sensus and decisional law have no place in American jurisprudence.
The argument behind this conclusion is the hyperbolic assertion that
consideration of international values and law will lead to the utter
38
displacement of American law. The quite obvious problem with this
stance is that the premise of the argument does not support its conclusion. If the concern is a total loss of sovereignty, what follows is that
32 Hence the criticism is that even if American imperialism promotes the rule of law, it is a
priori illegitimate to impose norms in a culturally monopolistic way. See supra note 26.
33 See John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 327 (2006)
(criticizing Court “for relying on international and foreign law, whose production process cannot
be easily understood, let alone influenced, by the average citizen”).
34 Former ABA President Frank Holman, architect of the Bricker Amendment, which
sought to make treaties presumptively invalid, see infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text,
justified the Amendment as marking the “line . . . between those Americans who believe in the
preservation of national sovereignty and national independence and those who believe that our
national independence . . . should yield to international considerations and some kind of world
authority.” See FRANK E. HOLMAN, STORY OF THE “BRICKER” AMENDMENT 22 (1954).
35 See, e.g., infra note 37 (statements by Justices Scalia and Thomas); Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 58 (2004) (“Using global
opinions as a means of constitutional interpretation dramatically undermines sovereignty.”).
36 Koh, supra note 4, at 52.
37 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (calling consideration of other
nations’ opinions on death penalty “totally inappropriate as a means of establishing the fundamental beliefs of this Nation”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(same); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(stating that “this Court ... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans”).
38 See e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867, 879 (2004).
(calling the internationalist “a rudderless person in search of a fundamental identity [who] may
well find himself or herself in the comfort of zealotry and the community of terror”); Joan L.
Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1320–21 (2004) (arguing that incorporation has potential to reverse entire
constitutional structure).
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domestic law should place some justifiable limits on the influence of
39
international law and norms in order to preserve domestic autonomy.
This is, however, precisely not the argument that conservative Court
members make - they argue for a total elimination of international
influence.
Take, for example, the internationalism-isolationism debate that
40
played out in Roper v. Simmons. The majority undertook a classic
two-pronged “evolving standards of decency” examination to reject
41
the continuing vitality of juvenile executions. This analysis consisted
of a determination of the “national consensus” regarding juvenile ex42
43
ecution and the “Court’s own judgment.” The Court determined
that consensus evidence established a national trend against juvenile
44
death penalty. Examining its own judgment, the Court cited sociological studies demonstrating that juveniles are not the “worst” of45
fenders. International consensus played the very limited role of
“confirming” the Court’s own judgment that juvenile execution violated civilized standards, which itself only came into play after de46
termining national consensus.
Justice Scalia, in dissent, however, characterized “the basic premise of the Court’s argument” as holding “that American law should
47
conform to the laws of the rest of the world.” It is this premise Scalia
48
contends “ought to be rejected out of hand.” Justice Scalia sets up a
false dichotomy in which either international law counts for nothing
49
or it totally usurps American values. He states, “I do not believe that
39 See infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable limits on the domestic enforceability of treaties); see also David Sloss, Non–Self–Executing Treaties: Exposing a
Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 4 (2002) (asserting that 19th century self–
execution cases struck appropriate balance between competing rule of law and separation of
powers principles).
40 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
41 Roper, 543 U.S. at 561; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion)
(creating evolving standards of decency test).
42 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–68.
43 Id. at 568–75.
44 Id. at 564–68.
45 Id. at 569–75.
46 Id. at 575–78. The Court states, “Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty.” Id. at 575.
47 Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Under this construction, either the citation of international law entails total deference or it is just “meaningless dicta.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Kenneth Anderson argues that prior to Roper it was possible
to believe that international law was just Stevens’ and Breyer’s “hobbyhorse,” but after the
decision, we should be concerned about the viability of basic American values. He states:
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approval by ‘other nations and peoples’ should buttress our commitment to American principles any more than (what should logically
follow) disapproval by ‘other nations and peoples’ should weaken
50
that commitment.” Although displacement of U.S. law is the purported reason behind Scalia’s conclusions that international values
should never be mentioned, there is obviously a deeper isolationism at
work. Justice Scalia’s xenophobia rears its ugly head when he moves
away from apocalyptic claims about foreign law taking over and discusses why foreign norms are inappropriate for even passing consideration. Justice Scalia takes pains to contrast our “centuries-old
American” legal tradition with that of countries with “tyrannical polit51
ical makeup[s]” and “subservient or incompetent . . . court system[s].”
Conservative supporters of treaty non-self-execution suffer the
same predicament when arguing signed and ratified treaties should
52
not be the “Law of the Land,” as provided in the Supremacy Clause.
Professor John Yoo, for example, advances a criticism of self-execution
based in separation of powers and the fear that self-executing treaties
will displace legislative enactments and give too much power to the
53
executive. The problem again is that this argument rests on unjustified melodramatic slippery slopism. There are many limiting mechan-

Justice Kennedy’s Roper majority opinion puts paid to the conceit that this is all just
a bit of fluff exaggerated into something sinister and conspiratorial by Federalist Society right–wing ideologues. . . . [but Roper] is very far indeed from mere flirtation. It
invites the deployment of a sweeping body of legal materials from outside U.S. domestic law into the process of interpreting the U.S. Constitution – and, moreover, invites it into American society’s most difficult and contentious “values” questions.
Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL’Y REV., June–July 2005, at 33.
50 Roper, 543 U.S at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 623 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 598, 601,
Justice Scalia describes American anti–homosexual sodomy laws as part of our “traditional
notions of sexual morality” which necessarily form a rational basis for the law. By, contrast,
foreign laws that allow homosexual sodomy are merely “foreign moods, fads, or fashions” (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)); see
also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Equally irrelevant are the
practices of the ‘world community,’ whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of
our people.”).
52 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding”).
53 John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non–
Self–Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2236 (1999) (warning ominously that “[i]f the United
States forges multilateral agreements addressing problems that were once domestic in scope,
treaties could replace legislation as a vehicle for domestic regulation”).
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54

isms in place to prevent treaty law from “taking over.” Although
sovereignty concerns might justify certain restrictions on treaties, for
example, the requirement that they be consistent with constitutional
provisions and have the status of statutory law, they do not seem to
justify the all-out assault on treaty law represented by the modern
55
intent theory of self-execution.
The modern construction of self-execution will be explained with
far more nuance in the next section, but briefly, the modern trend has
been to find treaties unenforceable domestically, even when they are
otherwise constitutional and provide individual domestic rights, because the instruments do not clear the extra hurdle of evidencing a
56
specific “intent-to-self-execute.” The challenge to exceptionalists is
to demonstrate why, in the absence of this extra hurdle, treaty law
would somehow displace all domestic legislation and destroy our delicate balance of power. Like Scalia, it is obvious that treaty exceptionalists fear, not that treaty law will be the only law, but that it will be
57
any law. These scholars’ isolationist sentiments rise to the surface
when explaining why foreign law should have absolutely no influence.
Professor Yoo, for example, decries the influence of European values
by observing:
Europe has been given to fluctuations of ideological extremes. In the Nineteenth Century, many European nations
still considered monarchy the best system of government.
Indeed, the other European powers intervened after the
French Revolution to restore the Bourbon dynasty to power. In the Twentieth Century, monarchy was followed by
fascism, socialism, and communism. As history has demonstrated, the performance of these regimes has been less than
exemplary. In particular, fascism and communism, which
were once viewed by some as advanced, modern ideologies,
58
were adopted by regimes that murdered millions.

54 Treaties are limited by justiciability rules, contract interpretation principles, and their
status as federal legislative law. See infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text (discussing modern intent theory).
56 See infra notes 113–14 and accompanying text (discussing intent–to–self–execute).
57 See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Treaties: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 346 (1995) (asserting that democracy argument against self–
execution “impugns the democratic character of every treaty made or that will be made by the
President with the consent of the Senate”). Indeed, Professor Yoo believes that treaty law is
never binding. It can only be given effect if Congress decides to pass a statute to enact its provisions. See Yoo, supra note 53 at 2218 (arguing that text and structure of Constitution justify
presumptive non–self–execution). See also Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the
Structural Constitution, and Non–Self–Execution, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 47 (2003).
58 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 326.
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Consequently, what appears to drive the modern self-execution doctrine is a primary belief that international and foreign law is illegiti59
mate and valueless.
To be fair, one can entertain a very healthy skepticism of international processes, just as one should reasonably question domestic institutional behavior. Many scholars have noted the ways in which international processes can be inefficient, ineffective, corrupt, and easily
60
manipulated for national interests. While these may be reasons to
61
argue for the reform of international institutions, they do not support
the conclusion that treaties should be unenforceable. The United
States voluntarily ratifies treaties after extensive negotiations and
62
consent of the President and a supermajority of the Senate. Only
after this process does the treaty become law enforceable through
domestic or international mechanisms. The criticism of international
processes might cause one to question whether the United States
63
should submit to international procedures specified in treaties, but it
simply does not affect the issue of whether treaties should be enforced
64
domestically. When a person seeks redress under a treaty in federal
court, our own judges, not these allegedly problematic international
bodies, determine the fate of the case. Moreover, one should be skeptical of claims that international law is per se flawed. Those casting
international law as less procedurally legitimate than domestic law,
tend to establish their argument by tautology. They prove their point
of domestic superiority simply by painting a picture of corrupt, self-

59 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 33, at 317–18 (“The difficulty for international law is that
nothing about its process of generation should lead us to believe that it should be used as a
trumping factor over our own domestic processes, nor is there anything about international or
indeed foreign law that should make us consider it intrinsically good.”). See also Larsen, supra
note 38, at 1309 (arguing enforcing treaty rights is per se illegitimate because judges may only
counter statutes by appealing to “supermajoritarian” Constitution).
60 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and
Non–Self–Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1558 n.2 (2003) (asserting that international legal
institutions tend to interpret their own power broadly). See generally José E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 324 (2006) (discussing various criticisms
of international organization from different groups and perspectives).
61 See id.
62 See U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.”).
63 See supra note 60.
64 Ironically, those opposed to treaty self–execution tend to assert that individuals should
seek treaty remedies through international procedures in the very fora they consider a priori
illegitimate. See infra note 110 (cases stating that remedies for treaty violations are exclusively
international).
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serving treaty negotiation processes contrasted with our purely65
democratic, incorruptible domestic legislative system.
Despite the ready criticisms, however, isolationist sentiment is
wildly popular. Many believe that the United States has its own traditions and should be exempt from the corrupting influence of liberal
66
foreign ideals. For sure, the “war on terror” has heightened Americans’ aversion, not only to international human rights restraints on
67
executive power, but also more generally to foreign cultures. I was
nonetheless surprised that among my criminal law students last semester, out of all the politically-charged subjects we discussed - rape law,
racial profiling, battered women’s syndrome, domestic violence - the
68
one thing that riled them up most was the case People v. Wu, in which
a Chinese woman who had attempted a parent-child suicide (the child
died, she lived) was permitted by the California appeals court to assert
69
a “cultural defense.” The court observed that Wu’s Chinese background was relevant to whether she was “reasonably provoked” into
70
the killing. The majority of my students, or at least the vocal ones,
were extremely disturbed by the ruling, believing that the substitution
of the reasonable Chinese woman standard for the typical “reasonable
65 See, e.g., Joseph Keller, Sovereignty vs. Internationalism and Where United States Courts
Should Find International Law, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 353 (2005) (characterizing international legal actors as unaccountable and even rent–seeking as opposed to domestic legislators
who are responsible to public). According to Keller, customary international law should be
ignored because:

[a]n article by a law professor may appear in a prestigious journal, boldly and authoritatively declaring X to be a well established rule of customary international law,
with great academic pomp and bravado, yet one cannot know if this article was put
together hastily in a desperate attempt to meet a publishing deadline. Or perhaps
more likely, given the strict criteria for law review articles (a topic should be “ripe”
and present a new idea not “preempted” by another author), the professor merely
espoused his/her theory because it was new or unique, and not because it is well supported logically or advisable as a matter of public policy.
Id. at 356. While the above is apparently a reason to reject customary international law all together, curiously, it is not a reason to disregard the writings of professors who support isolationism, argue in favor of federalism, revere originalism, and oppose treaty supremacy. See also
McGinnis, supra note 33, at 308 (asserting that only “good” body of law can constrain democratic
legislation and contrasting “bad” international law with “good” domestic constitutional law).
But see Resnik, supra note 22, at 1574 (noting that process by which international norms become
domestic law is often deeply democratic).
66 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 273–75 (describing dramatic negative responses by Congress
persons to citation of foreign opinion in Roper). See also Shane B. Kelbley, Note, Reason Without Borders: How Transnational Values Cannot Be Contained, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1595,
1630–31 (2005) (discussing congressional response).
67 See Martin S. Flaherty, “External” Versus “Internal” in International Law, 29 FORDHAM
INT’L L. J. 447, 448 (2006) (noting that war on terror has fueled American exceptionalism).
68 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1991) (unpublished disposition).
69 Id. at 879–80.
70 Id. at 884–85.
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man” standard was an assault on American-ness. In fact, many were
so passionate that foreigners should “check their culture at the door”
that they patently refused to argue the other side of the issue.
Popular sentiment against foreign law and cultures leads some to
argue that internationalism is a product of the liberal elitism of selfaggrandizing law professors and judges. Professors Yoo and Delahunty, for example, assert that internationalism “appears to be linked to
the emergence of what can be called a deterritorialized, ‘cosmopolitan’ moral sensibility, generally shared by governing elites of the ad72
vanced nations.” Similarly, Professor John McGinnis asserts:
Publicists [of international law] are essentially international
law professors. As a group they are not required to be representative of the views of their nation’s citizens nor are they
likely to be so. We have evidence, for instance, that elite international law professors in the United States are very unrepresentative of popular opinion, leaning Democratic ra73
ther than Republican by a ratio of over eleven to two.
One should, however, view liberal elitism arguments with a jaundiced eye. Such rhetoric has been a time-honored favorite of old segregationists and modern neo-conservatives to defeat measures that
protect religious, racial, gender, and other minorities from subordina74
tion by an oppressive majority. The trick is to switch characterizations, casting those who support minority subordination as “ordinary
folk” who are oppressed by overbearing liberals wishing to curtail
75
their freedom to support anti-minority policies.
71 Initially, some misread the case as allowing a foreigner to have a defense whenever an
act is legal in his country of origin. I explained, however, that the case really was about how
subjective the reasonableness standard should be and whether a jury should adopt the point of
view of a reasonable person from a foreign culture. Many students answered with a resounding
“no,” stating that immigrants have a positive obligation to assimilate to “American culture” as
soon as they arrive in the United States. When I asked what “American culture” is, my majority–minority class replied that it is the culture the “average” American possesses.
72 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 330.
73 McGinnis, supra note 33, at 314.
74 This tactic was used by Governor Wallace to drum up support for his pro–segregation
campaigns. See THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT
OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 77 (1992) (“Wallace portrayed the civil
rights issue... as the imposition on working men and women of intrusive ‘social’ policies by an
insulated, liberal, elitist cabal of lawyers, judges, editorial writers, academics, government bureaucrats, and planners.”).
75 See Kelbley, supra note 66, at 1632 (observing that conservatives argued against perceived “gay rights” opinion in Lawrence by asserting that “activist judges” were imposing personal beliefs on American population). See also Aya Gruber, Navigating Diverse Identities: Building Coalitions Through Redistribution of Academic Capital, an Exercise in Praxis, 35 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1201, 1209 (2005). (discussing “the co–opting of minority status by privileged
members of society”). In the 1992 Campaign, Vice Presidential nominee Dan Quayle famously
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Another method of denigrating international law, an old favorite
of Justice Scalia, is to argue that its sheer volume makes it susceptible
76
to citation for any given principle. Critics of international and comparative law assert that such law is essentially meaningless because
jurists can pick and choose among foreign principles to cite just the
77
ones they like. Justice Breyer’s response to this contention is smileprovoking:
How do we know we can keep [citation of international
sources] under control? How do we know we cite both
side[s]? How do we know we looked for everything? Well,
I’d say that kind of a problem arises with any sort of cita78
tion. A judge can do what he’s supposed to do, or not.
Despite charges, bordering on ad hominem attack, that they are
79
80
81
82
misguided, elitist, power-hungry, and even nepotistic, certain Jusblamed the “cultural elite” for imposing un–American liberal ideals on the nation. He characterized gay and abortion rights as products of “cynical,” “sneering” “Sophisticates” and their “radical” ideology and contrasted that with average “American” ideals. He stated, “Talk about right
and wrong, and they’ll try to mock us in newsrooms, sitcom studios and faculty lounges across
America, but in the heart of America, in the homes and workplaces and churches, the message is
heard.” Andrew Rosenthal, The 1992 Campaign; Quayle Attacks a “Cultural Elite,” Saying It
Mocks Nation’s Values, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at A1.
76 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for “invok[ing] alien
law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignor[ing] it otherwise”).
77 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 33, at 325–27 (asserting that malleable international law
serves as cover for antidemocratic judicial activism).
78 Scalia–Breyer debate, supra note 21 (Justice Breyer’s statement). Breyer goes on to say:
With the legislative history I’d say, and I’d say with [foreign sources], you’re a conscientious judge or you’re not. And if you are going to apply it unfairly, why wouldn’t
you apply all kinds of things unfairly? There are plenty of opportunities to do that if
you want to do it, but then if that’s what you’re going to do, go into some other profession, because I don’t see what the reward would be in a profession like ours, the
law, which prizes people being straightforward, I think, being honest and doing the
job properly.
Id. It seems unchallengeable that the selectivity argument can be used against any basis of legal
interpretation including Scalia’s sainted originalism. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 300–13 (1988) (stating bluntly that “the Court has flunked
history” and that “judges exploit history by making . . . it yield results that are not historically
founded”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601 (1998) (criticizing Court’s selective use of constitutional history in originalist arguments).
79 The tenor of Scalia, Yoo, and others’ criticisms seems to indicate that they believe “internationalist” Justices are foolish for failing to realize that they are either allowing foreigners to
rule the Court or their citation of foreign law is meaningless. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“‘Acknowledgment’ of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion of this
Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment – which is surely what it parades as
today.”). See also Anderson, supra note 49, at 33 (referring to international opinion as Justice
Stevens’ & Breyer’s “hobbyhorse”).
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tices are resolute that the American legal system has much to gain
from an increased understanding and incorporation of foreign and
83
international legal rules and norms. Like Justice Ginsburg, Justice
Breyer believes that the increasing comparativist nature of the Supreme Court:
reflects the “globalization” of human rights, a phrase that
refers to the ever-stronger consensus (now near worldwide) as to the importance of protecting basic human
rights, the embodiment of that consensus in legal documents, such as national constitutions and international
treaties, and the related decision to enlist judges - i.e., independent judiciaries - as instruments to help make that
84
protection effective in practice.
Other Justices, like Stevens and former Justice O’Connor, have
likewise been supportive of the incorporation of international values
85
into constitutional analysis. These jurists therefore endorse a practice
that many, like Scalia, characterize as radically and dangerously inter-

80 See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 330 (stating that internationalist “Justices . . .
stand at the very apex of [international] elites”).
81 See id. at 329 (speculating that Court cites international law to augment its own power).
82 Some critics go so far as to insinuate that the increasing internationalism of the Court is
a product of global aristocratic nepotism:

Supreme Court judges interact with their peers in other nations on a more regular
basis. Their long summer recess is a perfect time to make the acquaintance of justices
in their favorite nations. Lake Como or the south of France provides a good atmosphere for bonding. All of us seek approval from our peers and the Justices would naturally regard foreign justices as their equals.
McGinnis, supra note 4, at 326–27. See also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 329 (asserting that
Court’s use of foreign law indicates its desire to be part of “transnational class of judicial and
regulatory elites”).
83 See Scalia–Breyer debate, supra note 21 (statements of Justice Breyer); Ginsburg, supra
note 1. Cf. Mark Tushnet, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind”: Referring to Foreign
Law to Express Nationhood, 69 ALB. L. REV. 809, 810 (2006) (explaining that Court may have
nationalist reason for such incorporation because “non–U.S. law might be a way of ensuring that
the United States helps lead the world’s nations to a better way of governing themselves and
their peoples”).
84 Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., The Supreme Court and The
New International Law, remarks to the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-04-03.html.
85 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring); Sandra
Day O’Connor, Keynote Address at the 96th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (March 13–16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002) (“Although
international law and the law of other nations are rarely binding upon our decisions in U.S.
courts, conclusions reached by other countries and by the international community should at
times constitute persuasive authority in American courts.”).
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national. If they support internationalism to this extent, it is curious
that these same justices have not been vocal in opposition to the modern self-execution doctrine. The modern intent theory of selfexecution permits the government to be isolationist, not with respect
to foreign norms in constitutional law, but regarding the very international human rights instruments to which it has vowed allegiance.
Why are liberal Court members so much less passionate about the
self-execution doctrine than about interpretive incorporation of international law?
The answer may be that the principles behind the modern selfexecution doctrine are not as readily identifiable as isolationist as the
arguments against international influence in constitutional law. Those
opposed to treaty self-execution do not always denigrate the rights
and obligations in the treaty as having been influenced by radical or
87
corrupt foreigners. Rather, they characterize self-execution as a doctrine with roots in contract interpretation and civil remedies law, and
defend it by arguing that it preserves federalism and a delicate bal88
ance of power. I will demonstrate, however, that the modern selfexecution doctrine is isolationist at its very core. In fact, it goes further than arguments against constitutional incorporation because it
asks courts to ignore international law, not in the interpretation of
domestic constitutional rights, but in the very area where the constitutional structure requires judicial enforcement of international law.
II. SELF-EXECUTION: FROM CONTRACT INTERPRETATION TO ANTIINTERNATIONALISM
Any analysis of the self-execution doctrine and domestic enforceability of treaties should start with the Supremacy Clause, which
provides, “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
86 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (calling citation of international opinion “dangerous dicta”); see also supra note 66 (discussing congressional response to Roper). See, e.g., Peter Rubin,
American Constitution Society Supreme Court Roundup (July 1, 2003), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/SCOTUStrans.pdf (describing references to European Court of Human Rights in Lawrence decision as “remarkable” and “quite extraordinary”); Tony Mauro,
Supreme Court Opening up to World Opinion, LEGAL TIMES, July 7, 2003, at 1, 8 (noting recent “breakthrough term” regarding international law, in which “the ostrich’s head came out of
the sand”); ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 15–25,
135–39 (2003) (discussing “insidious appeal of internationalism” in constitutional interpretation).
87 But see John McGinnis, The Limits of International Law in Protecting Dignity, 27 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137 (2003) (arguing that human rights treaties are procedurally undemocratic
and substantively invalid because they do not apply economic theory).
88 See Yoo, supra note 53 passim.
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Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
This clause demonstrates, not only that treaties are enforceable domestic law, but also that they are federal law binding on the states.
Many scholars much more proficient in legal history than I have discussed the events surrounding the drafting and ratification of the Su90
premacy Clause and concluded that the Framers established a “mon91
ist” system, in which treaty law and domestic law are one in the same,
92
to signal the young nation’s respect for international agreements.
Thus, for the first fifty years of the republic, treaties were presumptively valid sources of domestic rights.
In 1829, the concept of self-execution was introduced into Su93
preme Court law in Foster v. Neilson. The case involved land rights
94
under a treaty between Spain and the United States. The Court interpreted the treaty’s directive that Spanish land grants “shall be ratified and confirmed” as only obligating Congress to pass legislation in
the future legalizing the land transfers. The Court subsequently found
the treaty domestically unenforceable because it simply did not create
95
any present rights.
The Court’s interpretive move is itself troubling. Ordinary contracts often state that parties “shall” commit future acts. When a party
fails to fulfill the future contractual obligation, courts will either find
the contract breached and order compensation or specific performance, or hold the contract unenforceable because the future obliga96
tion was too vague. In Foster, the problem was not that the future
obligation was too vague for judicial enforcement - the problem was
the Court interpreted the future obligation as requiring Congress to

89

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self–Executing Treaties, 89 AM.
J. INT’L L. 695, 697–700 (1995); Paust, supra note 12; Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 2095 (1999); but see Yoo, supra note 53, at 2231.
91 Monist systems are contrasted with “dualist” systems that always require implementing
legislation before recognizing a treaty as domestically enforceable. See Derek Jinks & David
Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 126 (2004).
Britain is a commonly cited example of a “dualist” legal system. See Lord Templeman, Treaty–
Making and the British Parliament, 67 CHI. KENT L. REV. 459, 48183 (1991).
92 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829) (stating that the “different principle” established by the U.S. declares a “treaty to be the law of the land”).
93 Id.
94 The treaty stated in pertinent part that “all the grants of land made before the 24th of
January 1818, by his Catholic Majesty, & c. shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in
possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories
had remained under the domination of his Catholic majesty.” Id. at 276.
95 Id. at 25455.
96 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. a (1981).
90
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act. The Court was then unwilling to force Congress to legislate to
fulfill the treaty obligation because to do so would have opened up a
98
separation of powers can of worms.
In the first instance, therefore, Foster set forth a somewhat questionable interpretation of the treaty. Why would the parties enter into
a treaty that involved only an illusory promise to ratify land grants?
The most straightforward reading of the treaty, and one the Court
adopted four years later when it overturned Foster in United States v.
99
Percheman, is that the treaty obligated the U.S. government, as a
whole, to recognize the validity of the land grants as of the signing of
100
the instrument.
As a result, it could be that the whole of self101
execution law arose because of an unfortunate treaty interpretation.
Nonetheless, courts frequently cite Foster as the basis for the selfexecution doctrine, relying on the following language:
[A treaty] is . . . to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when
the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either
of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before
102
it can become a rule for the Court.
After Foster, some cases simply continued to reaffirm unqualified
103
treaty supremacy, while others distinguished between executory
treaties, which only create future obligations and require implementing legislation to be enforceable, and executed treaties, which auto104
matically operate as valid domestic law. Early on, two other limita97

Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 315.
Id.
99 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
100 Id. at 88–89.
101 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1128 (1992); Henry J. Richardson III, Excluding Race Strategies from
International Legal History: The Self–Executing Treaty Doctrine and the Southern Africa Tripartite Agreement, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1091, 1110 (2000) (criticizing Foster’s treaty interpretation).
102 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 254.
103 See, e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488 (1879); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 366, 372 (1857); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 593 (1832). See also Paust,
supra note 12, at 771–73.
104 See, e.g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285, 288–89 (1902); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); See
also Paust, supra note 12, at 771 n.82 (citing cases). There are modern day offshoots of the executory-executed distinction. More recent lower court decisions have held overly ambiguous
treaty provisions unenforceable because enforcing such provisions would strain judicial competence. See, e.g., Am. Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 770 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (finding
98
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tions on the domestic enforceability of treaty provisions emerged. The
Head Money Cases of 1884 established that when a treaty’s provisions
create obligations only vis-a-vis sovereign states (horizontal obliga105
tions), that treaty is non-self-executing because it does not establish
106
judicially enforceable individual rights (through vertical obligations).
Other older cases established the equality of treaties to federal legislative law, thereby precluding the enforcement of treaties violative of
107
the Constitution.
These early constructions of self-execution are fairly uncomplicated. Despite questionable interpretive moves, Foster, at most, stands
for the relatively circumscribed principle that courts must give effect
108
to the meaning of the terms of a treaty, as evidenced by its language.
It generally makes sense for an enforcing court to try to figure out the
109
nature of obligations in the treaty. The other early limitations also
make sense. Treaties that simply do not create individual rights can110
not be enforced by private individuals. Moreover, the choice to put
treaties on the same level as federal legislative law seems beyond reproach. Treaty displacement of constitutional law would allow constructive amendment far removed from the process set forth in the
Constitution. It is reasonable to believe, given the level of consensus
required for constitutional amendment, that if the Framers had in-

article I of Geneva Conventions non-self-executing because its broad language does not provide
“any intelligible guidelines for judicial enforcement”).
105 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884).
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1957)
(plurality opinion). The straightforward claim is that treaties, like statutes, may not infringe on
constitutionally guaranteed rights. The more controversial claim is that treaties may not intrude
on subject areas over which Congress has “exclusive” power. See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d
1055, 1057 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing whether treaty can conflict with “exclusive” congressional power and concluding that property clause does not grant Congress exclusive authority
over transfer of U.S. property).
108 Carlos Vázquez notes, “The Court’s holding in Foster recognizes that the general rule
established by the Supremacy Clause, under which treaties are enforceable in the courts without
prior legislative action, is one that may be altered by the parties to the treaty through the treaty
itself.” Vázquez, supra note 90, at 702.
109 This does not necessarily mean that a vague treaty is per se unenforceable. Courts are
obligated to give effect to ambiguous treaty provisions as they would to ambiguous statutory
provisions. See id. at 715. (“[T]here may be imprecise treaty provisions that the judicial branch
is well suited to enforce directly.”).
110 Unfortunately, lower courts in recent years have found treaties that appear to confer
individual rights to nonetheless be exclusively between nations and therefore non–self–
executing. See, e.g., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850–51 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that
Security Council resolution does not confer individual rights); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d
57, 64 (Va. 1998) (finding that Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol
on Disputes do not create individual rights).
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tended to allow amendment through treaty process, they would have
111
said so.
While the early constructions of self-execution continue to exist,
the modern intent-based self-execution doctrine has really taken on a
life of its own. These days, lower federal courts routinely endeavor,
not only to discern the intent of the parties as to terms of a treaty, but
also to discern the intent of United States treaty makers and their
spokespersons as to whether the treaty should have domestic effect.
As a consequence, courts now find that a prerequisite to treaty enforceability is a general “intent-to-self-execute” on the part of U.S. treaty
112
makers.
This modern intent doctrine manifests in both milder and
stronger forms. In its milder form, courts will not enforce a treaty if
the language of the treaty or other evidence, such as statements from
various U.S. treaty makers, indicate that U.S. drafters did not intend
the treaty to be self-executing. Thus, evidence of “intent-not-to-self113
In the
execute” renders the treaty domestically unenforceable.
stronger form, courts refuse to enforce a treaty domestically unless
there is specific language in the treaty or from treaty makers that the
treaty shall be self-executing. These cases take treaty and drafter si114
lence as establishing non-enforceability, thus reversing the historical
presumption that treaties are by their very nature supreme federal
115
law.
How did the quite straightforward concept that courts should enforce treaties by their terms morph into a doctrine creating specific
evidentiary hurdles to the domestic enforcement of treaty law? The
reasoning, which is necessarily related to the Foster court’s mistaken
assertion that the Spanish treaty’s ambiguity involved future acts of
Congress, goes something like this: (1) Foster held a treaty domestically unenforceable because it obligated Congress to pass implement-

111 As a consequence, a treaty cannot abridge constitutional guarantees of free speech or
equal protection. A harder question is whether a treaty may create law in an area reserved
“exclusively” to Congress. See supra note 107.
112 See, e.g., Renkel v. U.S., 456 F.3d 640, 644 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding Convention Against
Torture not self–executing because Senate and President intended no self–execution) & infra
notes 113–14 (citing cases).
113 See, e.g., Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding provisions of
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights non–self–executing because “[t]he Senate’s
intent was clear – the treaty is not self–executing”); U.S. v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 881 (5th Cir. 1979)
(finding intent against self–execution in part from statements of individual Senator).
114 See, e.g., Igartua-De La Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding treaty self–
executing only when “the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self–executing’”)
115 Vázquez asserts, “The courts that have suggested that treaties are judicially enforceable
only if they were intended to be judicially enforceable have thus transformed the self–execution
inquiry in a manner that seems fundamentally incompatible with the text of the Constitution.”
Supra note 90, at 709.
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116

ing legislation; and (2) therefore, before enforcing any treaty domestically, one must look at the parties’ intent as to whether Congress
117
must pass implementing legislation. This logic may seem appealing,
but in the end it is incorrect. Foster simply held that a treaty failing to
establish any present obligations cannot be enforced. It addressed
neither a situation in which a treaty did establish current rights but
nonetheless called them domestically unenforceable, nor a situation in
which a treaty established current rights but other evidence indicated
intent on the part of U.S. treaty makers to render it domestically unenforceable. Consequently, it does not follow from the proposition that
the intent of drafters is relevant to determining the obligations within
the treaty, that evidence of “intent-to-self-execute” must be a pre118
requisite to treaty enforceability. This is, however, precisely what
119
modern courts hold. They find treaties unenforceable even when
they confer present, individual rights and provide mechanisms for private enforcement.
Other modern approaches to self-execution determine treaty enforceability, not solely by intent, but by applying a multi-factored test
120
or examining whether the treaty contains a private right of action.
Unfortunately, these tests also erect unjustifiable barriers to treaty
enforceability, grounded in a presumption of treaty law inferiority
121
rather than supremacy. In Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for example, the Seventh Circuit set forth a number of considerations underlying self-execution analysis:
(1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole;
(2) the circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4) the
116 This thesis initially appears to be supported by language from Foster stating that “when
the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engage to perform a
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.” Foster, 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) at 314.
117 Sloss notes, “Commentators have generally understood Foster and Percheman to distinguish between treaty provisions that have no domestic legal effect in the absence of implementing legislation (non-self-executing) and provisions that do have domestic legal effect, even without implementing legislation (self-executing).” Sloss, supra note 39, at 21–22; see also Vázquez,
supra note 90, at 701–02.
118 See Sloss, supra note 39, at 13 (arguing that Foster is not about “whether the treaty makers intended to create a non–self–executing treaty,” but about type of international legal obligation they intended to create and whether it was possible to enforce it).
119 See supra notes 112–14 (citing cases).
120 See, e.g., Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985); People of Saipan v. United
States, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974).
121 See Vázquez, supra note 90, at 711 (criticizing multi–factored test as invitation for judges
to “engage in an open–ended inquiry to determine on a case–by case basis whether judicial
enforcement of a particular treaty is a good idea”).
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availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right
of action; and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve
122
the dispute.
To the extent that prongs 1, 3, and 6 relate to the actual obligations in
the agreement, they appear to be fairly straightforward extensions of
123
Foster. Courts must at some level decide what the treaty means, and
124
the treaty must be practically enforceable. Prongs 1 and 2, however,
may relate to the requirement of “intent-to-self-execute,” and, as such,
125
are subject to the criticism set forth above. Prongs 4 and 5 appear,
on their faces, to reflect a presumption of treaty illegitimacy. If a treaty creates rights and mechanisms for private enforcement, it should be
irrelevant whether or not legislation or international processes provide alternate ways to vindicate similar rights. When a statute creates
rights and remedies, it is not rendered unenforceable by the existence
of similar rights or remedies under constitutional or common law.
Holding that alternative mechanisms render a treaty unenforceable
demonstrates a basic belief that treaty remedies are principally disfavored. The fifth prong is likewise gratuitously hostile to treaty law.
Why are courts permitted to weigh the “costs” of enforcing a treaty,
when doing so would be completely unjustified in the statutory context? If a statute validly creates rights, a court may not refuse to en126
force it on the basis of the costs of litigation. For treaties, however,
courts are invited to undertake roving “cost” analyses that can be used
to strike down duly enacted law. It seems like an absolute affront to
the President and Senate that courts can strike down valid treaty law
127
based solely on subjective cost determinations.

122

Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373.
The sixth prong can be interpreted in a couple of different ways. One way is compatible
with Foster in that it asserts certain treaty terms are so ambiguous that it would strain judicial
competency to interpret and enforce them. See id. at 374 (UN Charter provisions are “phrased in
broad generalities, suggesting that they are declarations of principles”);. A more problematic
way to interpret prong six is that the judiciary cannot enforce treaties if doing so interferes with
“political processes.” See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 375 (holding present case involved “foreign policy
matters” that “courts are ill–equipped to anticipate or handle”).
124 See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
126 The cost analysis serves to discourage treaty enforcement, given that courts are “exceedingly timid in enforcing treaties, particularly when individuals have sought to enforce them
against the executive branch of the federal government.” Vázquez, supra note 90, at 717.
127 This unjustified consideration of the costs of treaty litigation likely stems from Judge
Bork’s concurrence in Tel–Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, which is fairly obsessed with the burdens of treaty enforcement. He warns that permitting private Geneva claims would “flood
courts throughout the world” and “create perhaps hundreds of thousands or millions of lawsuits.” 726 F.2d at 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
123
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Finally, lower courts sometimes find a treaty non-self-executing
because it does not itself provide a “private right of action,” that is, it
128
specifies rights, but not how to remedy them. This private right of
action problem is also confronted in the statutory and constitutional
context. The idea is that not every statute that creates legal rights explicitly provides for aggrieved individuals to sue privately. Generally,
however, individual rights from statutes or constitutions can be enforced privately so long as some law provides a mechanism for private
suit, whether statutory or common law. Statutory and constitutional
rights may be enforced through external cross-referencing statutory
provisions even when the statute or constitution creating the right
129
does not itself provide an internal private right of action. When it
comes to treaties, however, courts view the lack of an enforcement
mechanism within the treaty as the end of the enforceability inquiry.
They hold that a treaty lacking its own private right of action is nonself-executing and thus unenforceable even though a federal statute
provides a private right of action or the individual seeks to invoke the
130
treaty defensively. Again, this signals a belief that treaty law is a
subordinate form of law and must clear the higher hurdle of having an
internal private right of action before enforcement.
It is relatively clear that the modern intent doctrine was not a necessary corollary of the principle set forth in Foster. Although some
experts have characterized the doctrine as the culmination of years of
131
poor legal analysis, I believe that isolationist sentiment was the driv128 There is some confusion among the lower courts as to whether a treaty must show intent
to provide a private right of action or an actual private right of action. Compare, Goldstar v.
United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968–69 (4th Cir. 1992) (requiring “an intent to provide a private right
of action”); U.S. v. Bent–Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985) (same) with United States
v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (“A treaty is self-executing if it creates privately enforceable rights.”); Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808
(Bork, J., concurring); Columbia Marine Serv., Inc. v. Reffet, Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1988);
Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306, 311 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(same).
129 For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private right of action for governmental violations of the Constitution. See also Vázquez, supra note 90, at 719 (noting that many enforceable
laws specify rights without remedies).
130 See, e.g. Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir. 2003) (habeas corpus statute
only applies to self–executing treaties); Raffington v. Cangemi, 399 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“seriously doubt[ing]” whether a claim based on non–self–executing treaty is cognizable in
habeas review); Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (same). But see Atuar v. U.S.,
156 Fed. Appx. 555, 563 n.12 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished disposition) (entertaining “the possibility that a habeas corpus petition may require a court to review a particular detention in light of a
non–self–executing but constitutionally ratified treaty”); Vázquez, supra note 90, at 710 (asserting that treaty rights may be invoked defensively or through external mechanisms).
131 See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a
Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1887 (2005) (calling modern “bad faith” treaty jurisprudence product of “combination of inattention and Supreme Court rhetorical ambiguity”).
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ing force behind the modern self-execution doctrine. Consider the
tangible results of the modern intent doctrine. The first practical effect of the doctrine is to allow the United States to sign and ratify
treaties guaranteeing individual rights, typically human rights treaties,
while simultaneously declaring that the treaty cannot be enforced by
individuals domestically, either by expressly stating so in a non-self132
execution declaration or otherwise indicating through more informal
133
statements. In essence, the United States can ratify treaties, appease
international actors, and pretend to be a leader in human rights, while
134
eliminating the only realistic mechanism for accountability. While
one might argue that international institutional mechanisms are sufficient for vindication of individual rights under, for example, the Con135
vention against Torture or the Geneva Conventions, that argument
rings hollow in the face of a stream of unmitigated violations of these
136
treaties by the United States since 2001. It is quite evident that the
best hope of curtailing violations is through individual lawsuits seek137
ing relief. Under the modern self-execution doctrine, such suits have
little ability to check government abuse because they will be dismissed
whenever a court finds some evidence of treaty maker intent against
138
self-execution or even silence on the issue.
The second thing the modern intent doctrine accomplishes is the
presumptive undermining of treaties signed before the modern doc-

132 See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. S4783–84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (“[T]he United States declares
that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights] are not self–executing.”).
133 See Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1967) (relying on post–
ratification statement of Attorney General).
134 Jordan Paust refers to the sign but reserve trend as “wretched” and criticizes the U.S.
reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, stating, “Rarely has a
formal attempt at adherence to a treaty been so blatantly meaningless and so openly defiant of
its terms, the needed efficacy of its norms, and the very possibility of its direct application as
supreme law of the land.” Jordan Paust, Avoiding “Fraudulent” Executive Policy: Analysis of
Non–Self–Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257, 1257
(1993).
135 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 469 (4th Cir. 2003) (asserting that Geneva’s
“values are vindicated by diplomatic means and reciprocity”).
136 See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over
the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 571, 631 (1991) (maintaining that
sign but reserve trend is fundamentally incompatible with “America’s self–perception as a leading proponent of human rights”).
137 Indeed, after their somewhat successful litigation, both Hamdi and Padilla were released
from military detention.
138 See Francisco Forrest Martin, The Constitution and Human Rights: The International
Legal Constructionist Approach to Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights, 1 FIU L. REV. 71,
85–86 (2006) (characterizing non–self–execution as “weapon” that permits “international outlaw” U.S. to engage in “double–dealing by, on the one hand, agreeing to be bound by a treaty
and, on the other hand, reserving the right to not give the treaty any effect”).
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trine took hold in American law. Typically, when individuals enter into
contracts, such contracts set forth specific terms that become enforceable when the contract is validly executed. It would be unusual for a
contract signatory to assume that the contract is unenforceable unless
it contains a provision explicitly stating that parties can enforce the
contract. Why, then, would treaty makers add a specific provision to
assert that the rights set forth in the treaty are domestically enforceable? The only reason they would do so is if they believed doing so was
required for treaty enforceability. In the era prior to the advent of the
modern self-execution doctrine, in which both the 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions ratifications took place, treaty makers would have
had no reason to assume that ratified treaty provisions are not pre139
sumptive federal law. As a consequence, looking for an explicit “intent-to-self-execute” will prove an impassable barrier for treaties rati140
fied prior to the last fifty years.
There is also historical evidence that isolationist sentiment underlay the emboldened intent based self-execution doctrine. After World
War II, there was dramatic expansion and development of interna141
tional institutions and instruments. The UN Charter was promptly
enacted, and ratification of the Genocide Convention lay on the near
horizon. After the ratification of the UN Charter in 1945, a couple of
cases tested the viability of the Charter as a substantive restraint on
142
states’ abilities to discriminate against racial and ethnic minorities.
Four Supreme Court justices even weighed in on the issue, asserting
that the UN Charter could provide a legal vehicle for curtailing racial

139 See Sloss, supra note 39, at 71 (noting that prior to 1965, there was little support for
modern intent doctrine); David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights?
The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez–Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 20, 101 (2006) (noting that before World War II, Court recognized presumption of treaty enforceability and after War said very little about it). There is one pre–Geneva case, Cameron
Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913), in which the Court appears broadly to
hold a treaty non–self–executing on the basis of intent, but that case seems to be exceptional in
Supreme Court jurisprudence. See infra notes 179–84 and accompanying text.
140 See Martin S. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent: Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law,
and Comparative Executive “Creativity,” in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 51, 71
(2006) (“[The Geneva Conventions] reflect an older conception of international law, which
generally did not address how a domestic legal system should provide remedies or otherwise be
ordered.”).
141 See David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L. REV.
579, 585 (2003) (noting that post–World War II period saw “the birth of the modern human
rights era”).
142 See Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 486–88 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (holing that “Alien
Land Law must . . . yield to the treaty as the superior authority”); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633, 649–50, 673 (1948) (discussing UN Charter in concurrences).
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143

discrimination. These cases were enough to cause concern to conservative politicians that international law might spell an end to se144
gregation.
In 1951, Senator John Bricker, a Republican from Ohio, introduced a draft amendment to the Supremacy Clause to make all trea145
ties unenforceable in the absence of implementing legislation. Many
experts conclude that Bricker’s primary purpose for introducing the
146
measure was to preserve white supremacy. However, preservation of
147
segregation was not the whole picture of the Bricker Amendment.
Statements of self-proclaimed “Brickerites” confirm that isolationism
and hostility to international law also lay at the root of the pernicious
amendment. Frank Holman, former ABA President and architect of
the Bricker Amendment, argued that the Amendment marked the
“line . . . between those Americans who believe in the preservation of
national sovereignty and national independence and those who believe that our national independence . . . should yield to international
148
considerations and some kind of world authority.”
The Bricker Amendment eventually failed to pass, and Bricker
abandoned his efforts after securing assurances from the Whitehouse
143 332 U.S. at 649–50 (Black, J., concurring (joined by Douglas, J.)) (asking, “How can this
nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race are permitted to be enforced?”); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring (joined by Rutledge, J.)) (stating that “inconsistency with the [UN] Charter . . . is but one
more reason why the statute must be condemned”).
144 In Senator Bricker’s view, Oyama and Sei Fujii signaled the looming threat of international human rights covenants “forcing unacceptable theories and practices upon the citizens of
the United States of America.” U.S. Congress, Senate, 82nd Cong., CONG. REC. 1st sess., 97, pt. 9:
11361. The quotation is an excerpt from a resolution adopted by the Tampa Rotary Club that
Senator Bricker read into the Record.
145 There were several versions of the amendment, but the basic premise of the amendment
was to ensure that “[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only
through legislation which would be valid in the absence of a treaty.” S. Rep. No. 83–412, at 1
(1953).
146 See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 57, at 348 (“The campaign for the Bricker Amendment
apparently represented a move by anti–civil–rights and ‘states’ rights’ forces to seek to prevent –
in particular – bringing an end to racial discrimination and segregation by international treaty.”);
Stanley A. Halpin, Looking Over a Crowd and Picking Your Friends: Civil Rights and the Debate
over the Influence of Foreign and International Human Rights Law on the Interpretation of the
U.S. Constitution, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2006) (stating that “real concern” of
Brickerites “appeared to be defending state sovereignty and preserving the ability of southern
states to maintain segregation and white supremacy in the face of the U.N. Charter”). But see
Nelson Richards, Comment, The Bricker Amendment and Congress’s Failure to Check the Inflation of the Executive’s Foreign Affairs Power, 94 CAL. L. REV. 175, 177–78 (2006) (asserting that
concerns over communism abroad and President Truman’s amassing of executive power
prompted Bricker Amendment).
147 See Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1989-90
(2004) (asserting that “while the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify the early human rights conventions may well have reflected Southern racism, it also reflected something else”).
148 HOLMAN, supra note 34, at 22.
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that the President would not sign the Genocide Convention or pursue
149
other human rights treaties. Nonetheless, that moment was very important in introducing a discourse pitting basic American-ness against
150
treaty law. It helped begin to erase the long-held presumption of
treaty supremacy and create a whisper of treaty law illegitimacy that
over time became a scream. Experts assert that current hostility to
domestic treaty enforcement is the result of a continuing haunting by
151
Bricker’s ghost. Perhaps this is why for many jurists today, “the concept of individuals enforcing international law has the whiff of an unpleasant oxymoron, implying a role for individuals in a legal system in
which, the traditionalists insist, only sovereign states are legitimate
152
players.” Domestic enforcement of treaty and customary international law is thus often characterized as the liberal creation of elitist
law professors and judges, and treaty enforcement is contrasted with
“time-honored” rules regarding separation of powers and executive
153
priority in foreign affairs.
Moreover, the rhetoric of Bricker has
been resurrected by modern law professors who decry the creation of
154
“world” values that threaten to displace American sovereignty.
In sum, the early self-execution cases, although certainly not
beyond reproach themselves, were at least narrow doctrines grounded
in reasonable contract interpretation and constitutional construction.
Today, self-execution has come to represent a separate, often impassable, independent barrier to treaty enforcement, grounded in a basic
hostility to the domestic application of international law. This hostility
is not seen in our constitutional structure, early legal history, or even
early treaty case law. To the contrary, treaty supremacy seems to have
been the traditional rule. Nonetheless, this hostility has been growing
throughout the post-World War II era, and it reaches a fever pitch in
the federal courts of appeals’ opinions in Hamdi and Hamdan.

149 Henkin, supra note 57, at 348–49. Eisenhower’s secretary of state promised that the
administration would not seek ratification of any of the various proposed human rights treaties.
See Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong (1953).
150 See HOLMAN, supra note 34, at 104 (stating that “all lovers of America” should be concerned because “the Amendment is the greatest issue which faces America today, greater than
taxes or inflation or even Communist infiltration”).
151 See Henkin, supra note 57, at 349 (observing that Bricker’s anti–human rights ideology
infected future treaty law).
152 Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and Historical
Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 433 (2002).
153 See id. See also Brief for Respondents, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2005 WL 2214766, at
*26 (asserting that self–execution could only be found from “text or drafting and ratification
history [that] suggest the revolutionary intent to create judicially enforceable rights”) (emphasis
added).
154 See supra notes 51 & 79–82 and accompanying text.
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III. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
While the lower federal courts have been busy expanding the
self-execution doctrine, the Supreme Court has been relatively reti155
cent on the doctrine, declining to broaden it in a similar manner.
Over the last 100 years, many Supreme Court cases have held the treaties at issue self-executing, even allowing for private suits in the absence of explicit private rights of action. In the 1924 case, Asakura v.
City of Seattle, the Court reviewed a suit brought by a pawnbroker of
Japanese citizenship seeking to enjoin enforcement of a city ordinance
prohibiting Japanese nationals from obtaining business licenses. Asakura claimed that the ordinance violated a treaty between Japan and
the United States providing that citizens of each country had the right
156
to reside, travel and carry on trade in the other’s territory. The Court
held broadly that the treaty was enforceable as “the supreme law of
the land” without searching for intent that the parties desired domes157
tic enforceability. Moreover, the Court did not question Asakura’s
158
ability to sue for injunction directly under the treaty. Asakura supports the principle that a person who has rights under a treaty may sue
to prevent the government from carrying out policies violating such
rights. The Court came to a similar conclusion in Bacardi Corporation
of America v. Domenech, a 1940 case that sustained the lower court’s
granting of Bacardi’s request to enjoin a Puerto Rican law that vi159
olated the Pan American Trademark Treaty.
160
In the 1933 case, Cook v. U.S., the Court upheld the domestic
enforceability of the Convention between the United States and
Great Britain for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liq161
uors. Cook was the owner of a British cargo ship seized en route to
Nassau by the U.S. Coast Guard beyond the territorial waters of the
United States. Finding liquor on Cook’s ship, the government fined
him $14,286.18 and proceeded with an action to recoup the fine by
162
forfeiture of the vessel.
Cook defended against the forfeiture by
arguing that the seizure of the ship violated the treaty, which only
permitted seizures outside of U.S. territorial water if the seizure oc155 See Vázquez, supra note 90, at 722 (noting that Supreme Court “has not said more than
a sentence or two about the distinction in any case for nearly a century”); Sloss, supra note 39, at
73 (“[T]he Court has never stated or implied that the treaty makers have the power to countermand the Supremacy Clause”) (footnote omitted).
156 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
157 Id. at 341.
158 Id.
159 311 U.S. 150, 162 (1940).
160 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
161 43 Stat. 1761 (1924) [hereinafter Smuggling Convention].
162 Cook, 288 U.S. at 107–108.
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curred within an area that “can be traversed in one hour by the vessel
163
suspected of endeavoring to commit the offense.”
The Court held that the forfeiture action could not be maintained
because the treaty was self-executing and Cook’s seizure was in viola164
tion of the treaty. Interestingly, the Court noted that despite the seizure being warrantless, if the seizure was only domestically unlawful,
the forfeiture action would have been maintainable. However, since
the seizure violated treaty law, the forfeiture action could not stand
because “[t]o hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure
165
would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty.” In this
sense, the Court elevated treaty law over domestic law. In addition,
the treaty itself prescribed specific international procedures for vindi166
cating violation claims by British vessels suffering losses. The Court
never entertained the notion that this provision could preclude Cook
from using the treaty to defend domestically against the forfeiture
167
action.
There are two other more recent cases of note, in which the Court
found the relevant treaties self-executing. In Warren v. U.S., the Court
was called upon to construe the Ship Owners Liability Convention
which created general liability for sickness, injuries, and death on
168
ships. Article 2 of the Convention provided the caveat that “national
laws or regulations may make exceptions in respect of . . . injury in169
curred otherwise than in the service of the ship.” The plaintiff, an
injured ship employee, argued ship owner liability was not limited by
Article 2 because the Article was non-self-executing and no legislation
170
had been passed implementing it. The Court held that despite the
reference to “national laws or regulations,” domestic implementing
legislation was not required. Thus, the provision was self-executing
171
and permitted exceptions under “general maritime law.”
In the 1984 case, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.,
the Court considered whether the Warsaw Convention’s liability limit
on lost air cargo was modified by the repealing of the federal Par Val172
ue Modification Act. In answering that question in the negative, the
163

Id. at 108.
Id. at 119 n.19 & 121–22.
165 Id. at 122–23.
166 See Smuggling Convention, supra note 162, at art. IV.
167 See Cook, 288 U.S. at 119–22.
168 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
169 Id. at 525 (quoting The Shipowners’ Liability Convention, proclaimed by the President
Sept. 29, 1939, 54 Stat. 1693, art. 2(2)).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 526.
172 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
164
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Court observed that the Warsaw Convention was self-executing and
not dependent on implementing legislation, despite its statement that
the liability limit “may be converted into any national currency in
173
round figures.” As a self-executing treaty, it could not be overturned
by the Par Value Modification Act because the Act did not express a
174
clear purpose to abrogate the treaty.
Not every Supreme Court case in the last hundred years has
found the relevant treaty self-executing. For example, in the 1984
case, INS v. Stevic, the Court, in dicta, asserted that Article 34 of the
1968 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
which requires “nations to facilitate the admission of refugees to the
175
extent possible,” was non-self-executing because it was merely pre176
catory and not intended to change the law. This language in Stevic,
however, is nothing more than the unexceptional claim, introduced in
Foster, that merely aspirational provisions in treaties do not give rise
177
to enforceable rights.
More problematic is the Court’s decision in the 1913 case, Came178
ron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville. The Court was called upon
to decide whether the Brussels Industrial Property Convention ex179
tended the term of a U.S. patent. Apparently, the main ground for
answering that question in the negative was that the American delegates to the Brussels Convention did not intend the treaty to enlarge
patent terms. This assertion appears quite suspect because the language of the treaty unambiguously extended such patent terms, as
even the Court admitted. Moreover, the Court’s divined intent of
American drafters came from negotiation statements ultimately re180
jected prior to the signing of the treaty. Notwithstanding the flawed
interpretive argument, the Court went on to observe that the provision at issue was not self-executing. The Court apparently based this
conclusion, not on whether the drafters intended the treaty to have
domestic effect, but on the “sense of Congress” after ratification that
181
the instrument was non-self-executing. Obviously, this is problemat173 Id. at 247 (quoting Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 22(4), 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), reprinted
in Note following 49 U.S.C. § 1502).
174 Id.
175 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
176 Id. at 428 n.22.
177 This “precatoriness” analysis has also been utilized by lower courts. See Tel–Oren, 726
F.2d at 809 (Bork, J., concurring); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619 n.2 (Cal. 1952). Cf. Vázquez,
supra note 90, at 714 (asserting courts have an obligation to construe vague treaty terms).
178 227 U.S. 39 (1913).
179 Id.
180 Id. at 44–49.
181 Id. at 49.
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ic language because it allows the nebulous post-ratification sentiments
of Congress to defeat the enforceability of a validly ratified treaty.
Perhaps, the Supreme Court’s reasoning can be explained by the fact
that courts tend to regard patent law as an exclusive area of congres182
sional prerogative. In the end, however, lower courts have not generally relied on Cameron Septic to bolster the intent doctrine, and the
case may simply represent an anomaly in Supreme Court self183
execution jurisprudence.
Looking at Supreme Court case law on self-execution over the
last hundred years, one sees a Court neither hostile to treaty enforcement nor determined to find “intent-to-self-execute” as a prerequisite
to enforcement. In fact, the Court has permitted the private litigation
of treaty claims through a variety of mechanisms, without regard to
whether the treaty provided an explicit private right of action. Justice
Breyer recently summarized the Court’s treaty precedents as holding:
(1) [A] treaty obligated the United States to treat foreign
nationals in a certain manner; (2) the obligation had been
breached by the Government’s conduct; and (3) the foreign national could therefore seek redress for that breach
in a judicial proceeding, even though the treaty did not
specifically mention judicial enforcement of its guarantees
or even expressly state that its provisions were intended to
184
confer rights on the foreign national.
Consequently, it is fairly evident that the new anti-international selfexecution rules were nearly exclusively a creation of lower courts. In
the last several years, the topic of hostility to treaty law has filtered
out of the courts and become more than merely a topic for academic
rumination. As soon as the Guantánamo detentions came to light, the
185
Geneva Conventions became the topic of popular discussion. Presi182 See, e.g., Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 500–01 (4th Cir. 1929) (creating
special rule for enforceability of patent treaties).
183 A Westlaw keycite search reveals only two non–patent cases that cite Cameron Septic.
The Florida case, Milliken v. State, 131 So.2d 889, 891 (Fla. 1961), cites Cameron Septic only for
the general proposition that “a treaty provision will not operate to supersede or suspend a state
statute if the treaty is not self–executing and if no implementing legislation has been enacted.”
The New York case, Garcia v. Pan Am. Airways, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317, 322 (1945), refers to Cameron
Septic to support its conclusion that the Warsaw Convention is self–executing.
184 Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2696 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See
Sloss, supra note 139, at 88 (observing that “[i]n more than 175 years since Marshall’s decision in
Foster, the Supreme Court has never applied the doctrine of non–self–executing treaties to deny
a remedy to an individual whose treaty rights were violated”).
185 See also Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1213 (2005)
(“Much sound and fury has been directed at memoranda leaked to the media, in which the President’s legal advisers take broad views of the independent presidential power to combat terrorism, and in particular of the President’s power to imprison and question enemy fighters.”); J M
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dent Bush quickly set forth the conclusory legal claim that the Geneva
186
Conventions are non-self-executing, and in the world opinion, the
187
United States became synonymous with disrespect for treaty law.
Eventually, two terrorism cases made their way through the lower
courts challenging President Bush’s program of military detention and
trial for terrorism suspects. In Hamdi, an American citizen designated
as an enemy combatant challenged his classification and continued
military detention as, among other things, in violation of the Geneva
188
Conventions. In Hamdan, a foreign national and Guantánamo detainee sought to have the Supreme Court declare President’s Bush’s
military tribunals illegal, asserting they violated domestic law and the
189
Geneva Conventions. The federal courts of appeals’ analyses of the
detainees’ Geneva Convention claims reflect unequivocally a fervent
embrace of the modern anti-internationalist approach to treaty selfexecution.
In Hamdi, the Fourth Circuit summarily dismissed Hamdi’s Geneva claims on the ground that the Conventions neither contain an
explicit private right of action, nor otherwise evidence intent to pro190
vide one. Yet Hamdi had asserted the federal habeas corpus statute,
which allows a litigant to challenge custody in violation of the laws
and treaties of the United States, provided him a legal mechanism for
191
suit. To this, the Fourth Circuit responded categorically that the treaty could not be enforced through any domestic legal mechanism because it was intended to be vindicated only through international pro-

Spectar, Beyond the Rubicon: Presidential Leadership, International Law & the Use of Force in
the Long Hard Slog, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 47, 117 (2006) (“Non–governmental organizations
around the world have played a critical role in critiquing Bush Administration policies on the
treatment of detainees.”).
186 See Dep’t of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 19
(Mar. 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds2.pdf.
187 See David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants’ Rights, 37
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 653 (2006) (noting that Bush’s policies are “widely viewed as a
blatant disregard of basic principles of the laws of war and human rights law.”). See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 415 (“If the dumb fiasco of the lawless mass detention of suspected
terrorist operatives at Guantánamo Bay by the current administration has had any positive
consequence at all, it is that the world–wide outcry of repugnance for this cowboy adventure into
totalitarianism has reminded us that other nations around the globe have much to teach us about
respect for liberty and its protection by the rule of law.”).
188 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
189 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2762 (2006).
190 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468.
191 Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (habeas statute). The Court had already resolved in Rasul
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004), that non–citizen detainees at Guantánamo have the right to
challenge detention under the habeas statute. The Rasul decision also states that the Guantánamo detainees’ claims “unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.’” Id. at 483 & n.15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)).
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192

cedures. Here, the court assumed, without explanation, that the existence of some international procedure provisions within the Conven193
tions necessarily precluded domestic enforcement. In the end, the
court’s main legal stance was to mistake the question of self-execution
194
with the question of justiciability, and find the Geneva Conventions
unenforceable merely for lack of an internal private right of action.
The D.C. Circuit in Hamdan did much better on this issue, recognizing,
“The availability of habeas may obviate a petitioner’s need to rely on
195
a private right of action.”
In other respects, however, the decision of the D.C. Circuit in
Hamdan elevates treaty law antipathy to new heights. The D.C. Circuit openly reversed the presumption that treaties are the supreme
law of the land, through a patent misapplication, bordering on bad
196
faith, of the holding in the Head Money Cases. The court of appeals
quoted Head Money for the proposition that “[a]s a general matter, a
‘treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations,’ and ‘depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and honor
197
of the governments which are parties to it.’” Yet conspicuously absent from the D.C. Circuit’s holding is the portion of Head Money that
states that a treaty may “prescribe a rule by which the rights of the
private citizen or subject may be determined,” and a “court resorts to
the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a
198
statute.”
The selective quotation of Head Money to create a presumption
that treaties can only be enforced through international procedures is
plainly unjustified. Relying on its created presumption that treaties
do not affect individuals, the court of appeals did not bother to discuss
the fact that the Geneva Conventions clearly obligate signatories to
199
treat individual captures in a specific manner.
Rather, the Court

192

Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468.
See Sloss, supra note 139, at 96 (noting the “numerous cases in which the Supreme Court
has approved domestic judicial enforcement of a treaty that was silent with respect to domestic
judicial enforcement, but provided expressly for international dispute resolution”) & n.395 (citing cases).
194 See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
195 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
196 See John Quigley, Toward More Effective Judicial Implementation of Treaty–Based
Rights, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 552 (2006) (calling court of appeals’ selective reading of Head
Money “misleading”).
197 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 38 (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598).
198 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598–99.
199 See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 15, arts. 13, 15, 18, 22, & 25–31; see David
L. Sloss, International Decision: Rasul v. Bush, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 788, 797–98 (2004) (contending
that Geneva Conventions “differ from some treaties in that they are manifestly intended to
create primary rights for individuals”).
193
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dismissed any domestic enforceability argument on the inapposite
ground that Geneva contains provisions setting forth international
200
procedures to resolve claims by signatories against fellow signatories.
However, this is clearly neither the principle set forth in Head Money,
nor one from any other Supreme Court case. Head Money makes
clear that so long as the Geneva Conventions create rights “of a na201
ture to be enforced in a court of justice,” they are so enforceable.
The existence of international procedures does not control the question.
Lurking within the courts of appeals’ analyses is the modern intent thesis. The courts interpret the existence of international procedures as an indication that treaty makers intended for the Geneva
Conventions to be non-self-executing. The D.C Circuit in Hamdan
asserts that it is constrained to this analysis by a footnote in the Supreme Court decision in the World War II case Johnson v. Eisentrager,
which states, “It is . . . the obvious scheme of the [Geneva Conventions] that responsibility for observance and enforcement of these
202
rights is upon political and military authorities.” The Eisentrager
opinion, however, substantively resolved the treaty claims at issue, and
the dicta on which the D.C. Circuit relies is unexplained and troub203
ling.
The provisions for international procedures in the Geneva
Conventions regard disputes between nations over treaty interpreta204
tion and inter-sovereign allegations of violations. The Conventions
simply do not say one way or another how individual claims should be
processed. There is plainly no language in the treaty indicating that
205
the rights set forth are not domestically enforceable.
Moreover, there is a good explanation for why the Conventions
would remain silent about domestic enforcement mechanisms - the
signatories had differing legal systems and varied approaches to do206
mestic treaty enforcement. This does not mean, however, that the
Convention negotiators intended to preclude domestic enforcement in
207
every signatory country. Consequently, the existence of international
200

Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 38.
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598.
202 Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 39 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950)).
203 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 790. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793 (noting that Eisentrager
rejected the Geneva Conventions claims “on the merits”).
204 See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 15, art. 132.
205 See Flaherty, supra note 140, at 71 (observing that “[a]t worst” Geneva Conventions
“leave the decision regarding whether a sovereign government should add complementary domestic remedies or defenses to the sovereign”).
206 See id. (explaining that older treaties did not generally address domestic enforceability).
207 Unfortunately, some lower courts have held that the diversity of international views on
self–execution means that signatories have a greater obligation to specify domestic enforcement
mechanisms. See, e.g., Postal, 589 F.2d at 878. This approach is criticized by many experts. See
201
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procedures does not demonstrate, as a matter of plain language or
drafter intent, that domestic enforceability is precluded. Moreover,
such a conclusion appears unequivocally at odds with the Supreme
208
Court’s holding in Cook.
In Hamdi and Hamdan, the Supreme Court had the opportunity
to reaffirm the supreme status of treaty law, clarify the distinction between self-execution and justiciability, and send a message to the
209
world that the United States does take international law seriously.
Unfortunately, the Court took pains to avoid these issues, finding by
hook or crook, only domestic remedies for the detainees. International law played a small but interesting role in Hamdi. Writing for the
plurality, Justice O’Connor held that President Bush’s military detention of alleged enemy combatants, including citizens, had been authorized by Congress’ Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military
Force (AUMF), which simply provides that “the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
210
2001.”
Although the AUMF says absolutely nothing about military detention of citizens, the Court concluded that such action was part of using
211
“necessary and appropriate” military force. As support, the Court
looked to law of war treatises, previous cases, and international instru212
ments, including the Geneva Conventions. Thus, the Geneva Conventions were used, not to limit the President’s use of war power, but to
213
help justify it. Hamdi only limits Presidential discretion by requiring

Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self–Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any
Price?, 74 Am. J. Int’l L. 892 (1980) (criticizing this aspect of Postal); John M. Rogers, Prosecuting
Terrorists: When Does Apprehension in Violation of International Law Preclude Trial?, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 447, 465 (1987) (asserting other signatories’ dualist systems should not affect self–
execution issue in monist systems); Vázquez, supra note 90, at 704.
208 See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text (discussing Cook and international procedures).
209 It would thereby quell the criticism engendered by the perception that that United
States flouts Geneva law. See Press Release, Amnesty Int’l USA, Annual Report: Americas
Regional Overview 2004, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport/americas.html
(condemning United States for failing to apply Conventions to detainees).
210 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (quoting Authorization of Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–
40 (September 18, 2001) [hereinafter AUMF]).
211 Id. at 519 (stating that “[b]ecause detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here”).
212 Id. at 520.
213 Id. See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942) (defining Article II power with reference to the law of nations). Thus, Hamdi follows the Bush administration’s strategy of “invoking
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that the procedure used to classify citizens as enemy combatants com214
The Court determined the
plies with constitutional due process.
process due to Hamdi by applying the test from Matthews v. Eldridge, a
215
case involving social security benefits. Having laid out the process due
to Hamdi under the Matthews test, the Court summarily declared that it
need not determine “whether any treaty guarantees him similar access
216
to a tribunal for a determination of his status.”
The Court, however, never entertained the notion that the Conventions might provide procedures different from those laid out by
217
the Court. In addition, conspicuously absent is any mention of the
Geneva Conventions’ prescribed conditions of detention, other than
218
access to a tribunal. It is quite clear that the President’s treatment of
Hamdi did not comply with the prisoner of war conditions required by
219
the Geneva Conventions. Because Hamdi had challenged the legality of his detention, the Court had an obligation to resolve whether or
not the Geneva Conventions applied to him and rendered his deten220
tion illegal. Moreover, the Court ignored the probability that the
“law of nations,” on which it relied in interpreting the AUMF, does
not consider detention in violation of Geneva’s dictates to be “necessary and appropriate.” The Court likely ignored this point because it
might have led to a finding that Congress had not authorized Hamdi’s
221
detention. O’Connor’s conclusion that Congress had authorized the
President’s detention program was what allowed her to steer clear of
the thorny issue of executive unilateralism. Consequently, the Court
managed to avoid the self-execution issue, and all substantive interna-

the law of war to avoid prosecuting terrorist suspects in civilian courts, while ignoring the limits
that the law of war imposes on the detention, treatment, and trial of prisoners.” Jonathan Hafetz, The Legacy of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 31–WTR FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 25 (2007).
214 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536–39.
215 Id. at 528 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
216 Id. at 534 n.2.
217 The Fourth Circuit had grappled with this issue briefly. Hamdi, 316 F.3d, at 469.
218 Hamdi had argued that “his prolonged indefinite solitary confinement” violated article 5
of the Third Geneva Convention. Brief for the Petitioner, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 2004
WL 378715 at *17.
219 Justice Souter asserted in his concurrence that acts like holding Hamdi incommunicado
demonstrated that the government was not in compliance with the Geneva Conventions. Id. at
549–50 (Souter, J., concurring). See also Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of the Japanese Internment in the Post–Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 307, 392 (2006)
(stating that Hamdi approved of treating war detainees like criminals).
220 See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 91, at 101 (noting that Hamdi failed to answer “crucial”
question of whether Geneva regulated President’s conduct of warfare); Laura E. Little, Transnational Guidance in Terrorism Cases, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 11 (2006) (calling Hamdi’s
avoidance of self-execution issue “remarkable”).
221 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 551 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]here is reason to question
whether the United States is acting in accordance with the laws of war it claims as authority.”).
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tional law claims, even though a discussion of the Geneva Conventions’ status and provisions was clearly warranted.
By contrast, in Hamdan, the Supreme Court did undertake an extensive discussion of the Geneva Conventions, finding the military
trial procedures unlawful as violative of Geneva Common Article 3,
which requires military tribunals to be “regularly constituted court[s],
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis222
pensable by civilized peoples.” In doing so, the Court adopted an
internationalist interpretation of Common Article 3, contrary to the
223
one proffered by the President. Amazingly, the Court was able to
reach the conclusion that Common Article 3 rendered the tribunals
unlawful without touching the issue of Geneva self-execution. In order to do so, the Court had to engage in an exercise of incredibly bold
legislative interpretation, reading the Geneva Conventions into the
224
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The Court’s basic argument was that the UCMJ requires the procedures used to try detainees like Hamdan to comply with the “law of war,” including the Geneva Conventions, and the President’s procedures did not so comply
225
because of their failure to comport with Common Article 3.
The Court held that Article 21 of the UCMJ acted as implicit
congressional authorization, with limitations, of the President’s power
to establish and employ military commissions to try enemy comba226
tants. Article 21 reads:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute

222 The Court opines, “Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection,
falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a
signatory nor even a nonsignatory ‘Power’ who are involved in a conflict ‘in the territory of’ a
signatory. The latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from the conflict described in Common
Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or
not).” Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796 (quoting Third Geneva Convention, supra note 15, at art. 3
[hereinafter Common Article 3]).
223 The President had maintained that Common Article 3 did not apply to the “international” war with al Qaeda. See Memorandum of President George W. Bush (Feb. 7, 2002), in Final
Report of the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations (Aug. 2004), Appendix
C, available at http://wid.ap.org/documents/iraq/040824finalreport.pdf. See also Hamdan, 126 S.
Ct. at 2795 (noting the government’s argument).
224 Id. at 2794 (analyzing the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1950)
[hereinafter UCMJ]).
225 Id. at 2796–98.
226 Id. at 2794.
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or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions,
227
provost courts, or other military tribunals.
The Court interprets this sentence as an authorization of the President
to use military commissions with the qualification that such commis228
sions comport with “the law of war.”
This interpretation of Article 21 is quite problematic, and to be
229
sure, it incurred the wrath of conservative members of the Court.
Experts are in fair agreement that Article 21 was not meant to authorize or limit the President’s common law authority to establish military
230
Rather, Article 21 represents Concommissions during wartime.
gress’ desire that the UCMJ’s establishment of court martial procedures leave unchanged whatever common law power the President
231
already had to try enemies for statutory violations or war crimes.
There are additional problems with the Court’s interpretation of
Article 21. Even if Article 21 does operate to limit the President’s
military commission authority, a plain reading reveals that it only limits the kind of offenses that may be tried - statutory or law of war of232
fenses - not the procedures that may be used. As much was recognized by the Court in the World War II case In re Yamashita, when it
stated that Article 21 “left the control over the procedure . . . where it
233
previously had been, with the military command.” Finally, the assumption that the UCMJ meant to incorporate Geneva procedural
234
rights seems unsupported by the history of the Code.
Consequently, by bringing Geneva into the Hamdan case solely
through the domestic UCMJ, the Court was able to scrupulously avoid
227

10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006).
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786 (“The UCMJ conditions the President’s use of military commissions on compliance . . . with the ‘rules and precepts of the law of nations.’”) (quoting Quirin,
317 U.S. at 28).
229 See id. at 2840–41 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
230 See, e.g., David Stoelting, Military Commissions and Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 427, 429 (2003) (asserting that Article 21 does not authorize tribunals but rather “simply
preserves the well–established jurisdiction of military commissions over crimes as established by
statute or by the laws of war”). Indeed, General Crowder, the drafter of Article 21’s predecessor,
Article 15 of the Articles of War, testified to the Senate that the Article “just saves to these war
courts the jurisdiction they now have and makes it a concurrent jurisdiction with courts–
martial.” S. Rep. No. 64–130, at 40–41 (1916) (testimony of General Crowder).
231 Scott Silliman explains that “[t]he word ‘recognized’ is key to an accurate understanding
[of Article 21] because it implies only acknowledgment, not establishment.” Scott L. Silliman, On
Military Commissions, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 529, 535 (2005).
232 The Article preserves jurisdiction with respect to “offenders or offenses that by statute
or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals.” 10 U.S.C. § 821. It does not state that the procedures of such military commissions,
provost courts, or military tribunals must comply with the law of war.
233 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20 (1946).
234 See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text.
228
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the self-execution issue. The questionable nature of the Court’s legislative interpretation shows the length to which the Court was willing
to go to avoid the self-execution question. Perhaps, the Court’s methodology can be understood as mere judicial restraint. However, the
Court clearly believed the Bush administration was violating interna235
tional law. Placing the fate of the Geneva Conventions in Congress’s
hands, especially when the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which
236
approves the President’s (illegal) interpretation of Geneva,
was
about to be enacted, cannot be rationalized as mere judicial moderation. Jordan J. Paust criticizes the Court’s approach:
This roundabout use of the laws of war may seem appropriate in terms of normal judicial caution, but when a judge
realizes that every violation of the laws of war is a war
crime and war crime activity by the Executive against a
habeas petitioner who is before the Court is apparent, such
caution in the face of international crime is less than satisfying. The Court should have mandated that the Executive
comply with particular laws of war when it was apparent
237
that they were being violated.
Moreover, declaring the Conventions self-executing would have
bolstered the United States’ credibility as a defender of human
238
rights. Thus, the Supreme Court’s avoidance of self-execution cannot be understood as mere accident or cautious temperance. The
Court’s jurisprudential choices reveal that it had internalized the view,
created by isolationist lower court activism, that treaty self-execution
is illegitimate. The Court’s avoidance evidences that it believed declaring a humanitarian treaty like the Geneva Conventions selfexecuting would have been too ambitious, liberal, or difficult.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has sought to demonstrate that the development of a
new isolationist approach to self-execution is a barrier to true interna235

See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text (Court’s Common Article 3 analysis).
Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); codified at 10
U.S.C. § 948(a) et seq. Section 6(a)(3)(A) provides that “the President has the authority for the
United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions.” The Act
appears to set forth procedures for military commissions that are not commensurate with UCMJ
procedures, which, according to the Court, violates Common Article 3. See Aya Gruber, Who’s
Afraid of Geneva Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017 (2007).
237 Paust, supra note 4, at 841 (footnote omitted).
238 Academics note, “The perception of the United States as a human rights leader has been
ruined.” Mark D. Kielsgard, A Human Rights Approach to Counter Terrorism, 36 CAL. W. INT’L
L.J. 249, 292 (2006).
236
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tionalism in American law. Over the past few decades, lower courts
have actively expanded the self-execution barrier to treaty law, thereby rendering ineffective older treaties and providing the U.S. government a mechanism to avoid human rights and humanitarian obligations in new treaties. Meanwhile, the Court has largely sat by passively, allowing lower courts to chip away systematically at the letter and
spirit of the Supremacy Clause. Today, however, the Court’s avoidance and passivity on the self-execution issues is more than just
grounds for academic dissatisfaction. In the midst of the “war on terror,” the status of human rights and humanitarian treaties is of dire
import. The United States has become synonymous with international
law violations, and President Bush continues to flout the letter and
spirit of the Geneva Conventions by his treatment of the Guantánamo
detainees. Yet all is not lost. As the Guantánamo detainees’ cases
make their way up through the lower courts, now challenging detention under the newly-passed Military Commissions Act, the Supreme
Court may yet have another chance to declare the Geneva Conventions self-executing and affirm that treaties are the supreme law of the
land.

